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Informational Cronyism 
Donald C. Langevoort* 
I. The Issues in Salman 
If Maher Kara, the Citigroup analyst at the center of the Salman case now 
before the Supreme Court,1 was forbidden under SEC Rule 10b-5 from trading 
securities for his own account while in possession of the valuable secrets to 
which his job gave him access, should he instead be able to give that information 
to family members simply in order to enrich them? I suspect that to anyone 
unfamiliar with the fine line drawing of federal insider trading law, the answer 
is clearly no. There is probably no more common form of corruption than 
generously shoveling the fruits of power and privilege to family and close 
friends.2 Cultures lacking a strong rule of law make it an art form. 
 Fortunately, that intuition conforms to the text of the Supreme Court 
precedent most directly on point, Dirks v. SEC.3 Justice Powell’s 1983 opinion for 
the Court makes benefit to the tipper a crucial element of joint tipper-tippee 
liability, but then explicitly, if somewhat awkwardly, says the necessary benefit 
exists when the tip is a “gift . . . to a trading relative or friend.”4 Justice Powell—
a former corporate lawyer no doubt familiar with the corrosiveness of family 
and crony favoritism—presumably included that language knowing full well 
that such behavior was a quintessential form of fiduciary breach of the duty of 
 
* Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
Thanks to Donna Nagy and Adam Pritchard for helpful comments. 
 1. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016). 
 2. On the “tunneling” of assets to friends, family, and self, see, e.g., Simon Johnson et al., 
Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 22-23 (2000); Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Agency 
Problems in Large Family Business Groups, 27 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 367, 369 
(2003). On insider trading as corruption, see generally Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as 
Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928 (2014) (developing a theory of insider trading 
liability as a form of corruption).   
 3. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 4. Id. at 662, 664. The Dirks test has two parts, the first of which is breach of fiduciary duty 
for personal benefit by the tipper. Id. at 660, 663-64. The second requires that the tippee 
knows or should know of that breach. Id. at 660. The Court gives three examples of types 
of benefit that satisfy the test, of which gift-giving is the third. Id. at 664. 
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loyalty.5 Salman, then, should be an easy case for the Court. The Ninth Circuit 
got it absolutely right.  
Salman is only noteworthy because the Ninth Circuit’s approach to personal 
benefit conflicts with the Second Circuit’s 2014 decision in United States v. 
Newman,6 which offered a revisionist reading of Dirks, thus setting up the 
inconsistency in the law that the Court is now being asked to resolve. Newman 
redefines the “family and friends” benefit, limiting it to situations where there is 
an “exchange that is objective, consequential and represents at least a potential 
gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”7 To be sure, the facts of Salman 
might satisfy even that standard given how the Kara family seems to look out 
for each other, but the Ninth Circuit took pains to reject entirely the Second 
Circuit’s heavy-handed editing and Salman’s reliance on it.8  
The Government’s strategy in arguing Salman thus seems straightforward: 
urge the Court to read and apply Dirks literally, without any gloss. It is difficult 
to believe that a majority of the Court really wants to announce to the world 
that in the struggle between fiduciary duty and family-style greed, greed wins. 
Insider trading enforcement is about political symbolism, a branding of 
American-style regulation through narratives that punish an excess of greed or 
abuse of privilege,9 albeit within a doctrinal framework necessarily tied to 
deception in order to justify fraud liability under Rule 10b-5. The facts of Salman 
reek of arrogance and infidelity.   
What makes the right advocacy strategy a bit harder is that both 
prosecutors and the SEC have chafed under Dirks since its inception and find it 
 
 5. Justice Powell would probably agree. While this Essay leaves most of the story of how 
Dirks came to be to Adam Pritchard’s legal archaeology, Justice Powell apparently started 
from the belief that the insider-fiduciary’s faithless motivation (including gift-giving) is 
sufficient to establish liability. A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 
SMU L. REV. 857, 862 (2015). The objective “personal benefit” add-on was Justice 
O’Connor’s idea. Id. at 865-66. Justice Powell’s elaboration of the three kinds of benefits 
softens this accommodation, presumably to make clear that benefit to the tipper is just 
evidence of corrupt intent, a category that includes family cronyism. So even Justice 
Powell—the founding father of tipper-tippee liability—would likely favor liability in 
Salman.   
 6. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015). Newman seems correct on one 
basic point: the tippee must be sufficiently aware of a benefit, not just that there was 
some kind of breach of confidentiality. Id. at 447-50.   
 7. Id. at 452.   
 8. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899 
(2016). 
 9. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of 
Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1320-21 (1999). For a more recent 
account of both the law and the politics of insider trading enforcement, see DONALD C. 
LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET, AND THE 
DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 64-66 (2016). 
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unnecessarily restrictive. Thus, while winning the case is of first-order 
importance, nudging the Court to endorse a flexible standard for tipper-tippee 
liability is also a goal. This is not just a self-serving tactic for making tipping 
cases easier for the government to win. The Dirks test has long been criticized as 
substantively incoherent from a wide variety of perspectives;10 even Richard 
Epstein’s recent neoconservative restatement of insider trading law in light of 
Newman has little good to say about it conceptually.11 As we shall see, this test 
has not held up well over time. 
There is much at stake here. The Second Circuit’s narrowing of personal 
benefit was not in the intra-familial context, but instead in the murky world of 
selective disclosure from company insiders to analysts and portfolio managers.12 
Sometimes there are quid pro quos, sometimes not. Newman gave a green light to 
tips that lack “a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”13 That is frustrating to 
government enforcers, who see all sorts of mischief in such cronyism. Many 
(perhaps most) insider tips are at the very least arrogant displays of status and 
power: high-level insiders display their dominance, lesser ones their access. The 
motivation behind such displays is some diffuse combination of ego basking and 
the expectation that favors are often repaid. Before Newman, it could reasonably 
be assumed that these motivations fit snugly between Dirks’ second and third 
types of benefits: reputational and gift-giving.14 Newman implies otherwise, 
however. The Second Circuit’s language is pernicious in a wide variety of 
professional settings that involve fiduciary disloyalty without any visible return 
promise. Under any sensible reading of Dirks, there should be liability when an 
insider plays a corrupted Santa Claus with corporate secrets, even if the 
relationship is not of the “best friend forever” variety. 
So that frames the tactical question for the Government: how to win its case 
against Salman and prompt language in the opinion that repudiates Newman on 
selective disclosure and gift-giving or—even better—softens Dirks’ insistence on 
personal benefit. In the hands of a thoughtful Justice, the crafting of such an 
opinion without doing violence to the core of the earlier precedent would not 
be hard. Personal benefit makes some sense because it ties tipping to trading as 
twin forms of fiduciary disloyalty. As noted, the cronyism of gift-based tipping 
puts it easily in the disloyalty category.  
 
 10. See 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND 
PREVENTION § 4:5 (West 2016). 
 11. Richard A. Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading After United 
States v. Newman, 125 YALE L.J. 1482, 1508-10 (2016). Epstein sees Salman as a relatively 
easy case on its facts. Id. at 1528. 
 12. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443-44. 
 13. Id. at 452.  
 14. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64. 
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Justice Powell was deeply concerned with the idea of imposing liability 
where the tippee was unaware that the information derived from fiduciary 
misuse.15 (He also held an overly rosy view of the role of investment analysts in 
the financial markets, writing more than a decade before recognition of the 
pervasiveness of analyst conflicts of interest became commonplace.16) But the 
work of providing protection to tippees who act in good faith should be left 
mainly to the awareness requirement, the second step in the Dirks test. The 
sensible approach is to acknowledge that fiduciary irresponsibility comes in 
forms both subtle and blatant, inside families and in business settings. Any 
disloyalty should suffice, so long as the tippee is in a position to understand that 
the disloyalty motivated the tip. The next two sections will elaborate on this and 
offer some other ideas that could be worked into an opinion making Salman a 
new and better Dirks. 
II. The Road to Salman 
As the foregoing comments on Salman, Newman, and Dirks show, insider 
trading law is still a work in progress. Some underappreciated turning points as 
the law has wobbled between an excess of ambition and undue restriction are 
worth noting.    
Contemporary insider trading jurisprudence starts not with Dirks but with 
Chiarella v. United States,17 three years earlier. There, the Court—in a seminal 
opinion by Justice Powell—established that insider trading liability under Rule 
10b-5 derives from the insider’s breach of fiduciary duty to other marketplace 
traders.18 The standard doctrinal story is that the decisions in the Chiarella and 
Dirks cases were repudiations of the SEC’s theretofore boundless “parity of 
information” approach to insider trading liability, supposedly promising all 
investors a level playing field in terms of information access.19 But parity of 
information oversimplified the official position at the time, which was severely 
tested by the recognition that much insider trading was based on market 
information, the supposed lifeblood of Wall Street.20 The SEC wanted some 
combination of access and awareness of impropriety to determine who could 
trade or not. The clearest formulation of this came in a 1971 administrative 
 
 15. Id. at 662-63. 
 16. Id. at 658. For a discussion of analyst conflicts and insider trading, see LANGEVOORT, 
INSIDER TRADING, supra note 10, § 11:2-3.   
 17. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 18. Id. at 230. 
 19. Chiarella was quite clear in rejecting the parity approach. 445 U.S. at 233. 
 20. See generally Arthur Fleischer, Jr. et al., An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose 
Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1973) (setting forth challenges to insider 
trading doctrine when secrets involve knowledge of future marketplace activity, such 
as a tender offer). 
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proceeding, In re Investors Management Co.21 This awareness/fairness-based 
approach made it easy to hold tippees liable, without much further inquiry.   
Because of the subsequent reformulation of the law by the Supreme Court, 
that SEC opinion can be put in the historical dustbin. Not so the concurrence by 
Commissioner Richard Smith, who was an establishment conservative much 
like Justice Powell in background and demeanor. As Justice Powell would a 
decade later, Commissioner Smith insisted that duty was the key to insider 
trading liability.22 Accordingly, he crafted an approach to tipper-tippee liability 
based on the tipper’s breach of duty, with tippee liability deriving from the 
tipper’s breach.23 Justice Powell even explicitly gave Smith credit for this in 
Dirks.24 But there is a key difference between the two opinions. While Smith 
clearly saw the insider’s fiduciary duty as significant, he did not believe it was 
the only possible source of duty. For example, Smith said that the non-fiduciary 
theft of information would also violate a duty to the issuer (and thus trigger 
tippee liability); otherwise too troubling a loophole would be left open in insider 
trading law.25  
Had Justice Powell similarly been willing to treat duty as flexible enough to 
extend beyond the fiduciary principle when the misuse of information was 
patently wrongful, tipper-tippee law would have taken a different and better 
course. Instead, now tightly locked into the fiduciary framework, the Court had 
to find a way to “fiduciarize” tippees who otherwise have no relationship with 
the company whose shares they are trading.26 The solution was the two-part 
Dirks test now at issue in Salman. In other words, the Dirks test is not an ad hoc 
judicial expression of preferred insider trading policy but rather an effort to 
describe when the actions of tipper and tippee are knit together closely enough 
to charge the tippee with breach of the tipper’s fiduciary duty. That is worth 
keeping in mind. 
As noted earlier, the SEC and prosecutors despised the new constraints. 
They went to work to craft an alternative insider trading liability theory, based 
on misappropriation as a deceptive breach of fiduciary duty to the source of the 
information. Once this misappropriation theory gained traction in the lower 
 
 21. Inv’rs Mgmt. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 9267, 44 SEC Docket 633, 644 (July 29, 1971). 
 22. Id. at 649-50 (Comm’r Smith, concurring). 
 23. Id. 
 24. 463 U.S. at 662-63. 
 25. 44 SEC Docket at 650 n.2 (“A duty not to steal or knowingly receive stolen goods or 
exercise dominion over goods known to be owned by others exists toward the 
corporation even without the presence of a special relationship.”). 
 26. 445 U.S. at 230 n.12. For this, the Court cites an ABA Committee Letter, which in turn 
cites Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds sub nom. 
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974). Schein addressed insider trading liability under 
Florida common law. Id. at 820; see also LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING, supra note 10, 
§ 4:8.  
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courts, enforcers started arguing that Dirks’ personal benefit test did not apply 
at all in misappropriation cases.27 Rather, noticing how closely the 
misappropriation theory resembled the analytical structure for honest services 
fraud under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes,28 they argued that tippees 
were essentially trafficking in stolen information, so tippee liability was 
justifiable as long as the tippee was sufficiently aware of the taint, without 
regard for any insider benefit. A key win for the enforcers was United States v. 
Falcone, written by then-Judge Sotomayor, a high-profile misappropriation case 
where the personal benefit issue was essentially ignored.29 Eventually, this 
distinction was abandoned—the Second Circuit later ruled that Dirks does apply 
to misappropriation30—but the stolen goods idea persists in theory and dicta.31 
As an earlier case that then-Judge Sotomayor relied on in Falcone had pointed 
out, everyone understands that the passage of valuable secrets is “not for 
nothing.”32 The Supreme Court should keep that in mind in Salman too. 
Over time, the Dirks test itself was applied more and more liberally by the 
lower courts.33 The pecuniary-benefit prong of the personal benefit test, for 
example, has been found satisfied not only by money but also by in-kind 
conveyances, including a jar of honey, live lobsters, restaurant dinners, and 
tickets to the musical Jersey Boys.34 Nearly all courts applying the gift prong for 
personal benefit now at issue in Salman have done so liberally, with a few hinting 
that the simple absence of a legitimate business reason for conveying the 
information was enough to make it a gift tip.35 Eventually, there was not much 
left to the personal benefit test except for showing some kind of breach by the 
 
 27. See LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING, supra note 10, § 6:13 (collecting cases). 
 28. 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 1343 (2015). 
 29. 257 F.3d 226, 234-35 (2d Cir. 2001). Falcone involved the improper advance distribution 
of copies of Business Week magazine, from which recipients could see what companies 
would be mentioned favorably or unfavorably, and trade in advance of the market-
moving commentary. Id. at 227.  
 30. See SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285-88 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 31. See SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d 558, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 32. United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Sablone v. 
United States, 510 U.S. 976 (1993). 
 33. The SEC and prosecutors were emboldened to push back against the strictures of the 
Dirks test by Congress, which passed two insider trading sanction enhancements in 1984 
and 1988 on an overwhelming bipartisan basis. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677; Insider Trading Sanctions 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264. In the course of the former, a House 
committee expressed its hope that Dirks would be read narrowly so as not to exculpate 
bona fide insider trading abuses. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 14-15 (1983). 
 34. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING, supra note 10, § 4:6 at 4-12. 
 35. See, e.g., SEC v. Rubin, No. 91 CIV. 6531(MBM), 1993 WL 405428, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 
1993). 
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tipper of his duty of loyalty and the tippee’s awareness thereof. And as all of this 
was happening, the SEC’s adoption of Regulation FD in 2000 took direct aim at 
the kind of selective disclosure to analysts that Justice Powell (naively, I think) 
had treated as an unqualified good.36 In sum, Dirks has not held up all that well 
over time. 
This chapter of the story culminated in Newman. The softening of Dirks 
happened just as there appeared to be a rapid rise in criminal prosecutions in the 
Southern District of New York and a lengthening of sentences for 
noncooperators. Even those otherwise disposed to strong insider trading 
enforcement raised questions about staying within the law’s spirit and bounds.37 
So the pushback was no surprise, only its form and intensity. Now the Supreme 
Court will have its say. Is a stronger Dirks needed, or are there other, better ways 
to address the overcriminalization threat? 
III. Other Directions 
As noted at the end of Part I, the most satisfying way to interpret Dirks today 
is to say that any deceptive form of corruption or disloyalty by the tipper suffices 
under the first part of the test, leaving the work of protecting tippees who act in 
good faith to the second part: the awareness prong. However, the grant of 
certiorari in Salman was only on the first part of the Dirks test: the meaning of 
personal benefit in the family gift-giving setting.  
Newman addressed both parts of the test. Under the facts of the case, its 
holding that the tippees had insufficient awareness of any breach by the tipper 
is palatable. But the reasoning is pernicious, insisting that prosecutors must 
prove that the tippee knew of the breach. That is not what Dirks says. Although 
Newman quotes Dirks accurately at the outset that the standard is that the tippee 
“knows or should know” of the breach and benefit,38 everything in the court’s 
analysis thereafter ignores the word “should.” Perhaps Newman was thinking just 
about criminal prosecutions, where the added statutory burden of showing 
willfulness might justify the more stringent standard of proof. That would be a 
 
 36. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2015). Regulation FD makes it unlawful for a high-level insider of a 
public company to convey material nonpublic information to an analyst, portfolio 
manager, or large shareholder unless that same information is publicly disclosed at the 
same time. Id. 
 37. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps, 
and Strategies, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 281, 283-84. 
 38. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983)). Interestingly, to “know 
or have reason to know” are the words Commissioner Smith used in Investors 
Management. Inv’rs Mgmt. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 9267, 44 SEC Docket 633, 649 
(July 29, 1971) (Comm’r Smith, concurring). 
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more fitting reaction to prosecutorial zeal, but the opinion does not indicate that 
was its reason.39  
It would be helpful, then, if somewhere in the Salman opinion the Court 
would offer more clarity on the tippee’s required state of mind, if only to show 
that heavy-handedness on the personal benefit prong is unnecessary when there 
is a fair insistence on awareness of the breach. The Court could do even more 
good by framing how the inquiry into the tippee’s awareness works in criminal 
cases as opposed to civil ones. To this day, the precise meaning of “willfulness” 
in securities fraud is inexcusably elusive,40 yet it represents the most direct 
connection to the overcriminalization problem that so many see and that 
animated the Court’s recent activism in pruning white-collar crime 
prosecutions.41  
Beyond those helpful clarifications, is it plausible that the Court might take 
this occasion to be far more aggressive and rethink its insider trading 
jurisprudence entirely? There is much to be said, as Donna Nagy urges,42 for 
jettisoning both Chiarella and Dirks as failed experiments and substituting a 
more flexible duty to abstain or disclose that includes information wrongfully 
obtained by theft and conversion—Chief Justice Burger’s dissenting approach in 
Chiarella,43 and Commissioner Smith’s in Investors Management.44 This Essay 
leaves it to Nagy to explain why this is the best way to make sense of insider 
trading law, especially as it is articulated in the third case of the Supreme Court’s 
insider trading trilogy, United States v. O’Hagan.45 This Court, however, may be 
too incrementalist for so bold an approach and is more likely to say that any 
flaws in the doctrinal foundation are for Congress to fix.  
 
 39. A simpler solution would have been simply to correct the trial judge, who had said that 
tippee knowledge need not extend to the benefit, only the breach. See Newman, 773 F.3d 
at 447-48 (discussing trial court ruling). 
 40. Section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2015), makes criminal liability 
depend on a showing of willfulness, above and beyond the violation itself. Precisely what 
that means has long been unclear. See generally Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 
61 DUKE L.J. 511, 555-60 (2011) (discussing the meaning of fraud for criminal 
prosecutions). 
 41. Other recent cases demonstrate a concern with white-collar crime overbreadth. See 
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (overturning governor’s bribery 
conviction for overbroad interpretation of “official act”); Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 
1074 (2015) (refusing to treat disposal of fish as criminal destruction of records); and 
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (narrowing honest services fraud standard for 
corporate misbehavior). 
 42. Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. CORP. L. 
(forthcoming 2016). 
 43. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 44. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25. 
 45. 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (upholding misappropriation theory for insider trading liability). 
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The possibility of a legislative solution surely will be in the Court’s mind 
whatever it does. Since Chiarella, the Court has been frustrated at Congress and 
the SEC for leaving nearly all the fashioning of securities fraud law, particularly 
insider trading law, to the courts.46 The Court will likely express this frustration 
yet again in Salman. Only Congress has the authority to do what really needs to 
be done: create an insider trading prohibition, not as an awkward derivative of 
the law of deceit, but rather as a distinct form of market abuse. Since Newman, 
efforts in that direction have begun. If the Court wanted to be entirely strategic, 
it could simply render a horrible decision to pressure Congress to act (what 
contract scholars call a penalty default interpretation).47  
Of course, putting the law of insider trading up for political bidding is not 
necessarily the route to a better place. If insider trading is worth prohibiting, 
however, the prohibition should cover all tippees who are aware that the 
information has come to them in a visibly wrongful way, whether by breach of 
fiduciary duty, sale of the information, gratuitous conveyance, or theft. A 
pending bill in the House of Representatives by Congressman Jim Himes 
proposes a good step in this direction.48 Above all, there should be a meaningful 
separation between criminal insider trading and that which can be remedied 
only through civil enforcement.  
Legislation is for the future, however—if ever. For now, it is difficult to 
imagine anyone genuinely opposed to deeming what Maher Kara or Bassam 
Salman did unlawful insider trading.49 Read judiciously, Dirks concurs. 
Hopefully the Court will not make a bigger mess of things by suggesting 
otherwise.  
 
 46. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233-34. 
 47. See, e.g., Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 663, 664 (2004). 
 48. H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015) (creating liability for any person who trades on material 
nonpublic information if such person “knows, or recklessly disregards, that such 
information has been obtained wrongfully, or . . . [that using it to trade securities] would 
constitute a wrongful use of such information”).  
 49. Unless they think insider trading should not be unlawful in the first place. 
